Understanding the Aftermath of Assad: Syria’s Path Forward
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The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship has sparked celebrations among Syrians, leading to questions about the role of Hayat Tahrir al Sham and the future for minority groups. The conversation highlights the origins of Syria’s Baathist regime, the 2011 uprising, and the regime’s reliance on foreign support. While hope exists for a better future, significant challenges remain as the nation confronts the void left by Assad’s rule.
This week, millions of Syrians are rejoicing at the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s oppressive regime. The swift progression of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and the unexpected downfall of Assad’s authority raise pivotal questions about HTS’s ideology and the future of Syria’s minority populations. Journalist Anand Gopal, in conversation with Jacobin founding editor Bhaskar Sunkara, delves into the history of Syrian Baathism and the events precipitating the 2011 revolution.
The roots of the Syrian regime trace back to the Baath Party coup in the 1960s. Hafez al-Assad assumed power in 1970, modifying earlier land reforms and creating a state reliant on the Alawite security apparatus and the Sunni bourgeoisie. Though the regime offered social services, it demanded complete political compliance, resulting in a brutal authoritarian state with no tolerance for dissent.
When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000, ongoing neoliberal reforms further deteriorated the welfare system without any political progress. By 2011, discontent erupted into a large-scale peaceful uprising primarily comprised of working- and middle-class Syrians. The regime’s violent response involved lethal crackdowns, torture, and mass arrests, prompting civilians to form armed resistance groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
Initially, the Assad regime’s support came chiefly from Alawites and Sunni elite in major cities. As the revolution intensified, fears of persecution forced minority communities to remain loyal to Assad despite their discontent. Over time, external support from Russia and Iran bolstered Assad’s position, even as the rebellion adopted a more Islamist character, fragmenting the opposition along ideological lines.
The Assad regime systematically marginalized leftist and secular movements while promoting Islamic rhetoric in society during the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. As a result, the early protests, initially focused on secular and democratic aspirations, witnessed a division between secular and Islamist factions. The latter gained traction due to their practical responses to social issues and relative integrity, unlike the more corrupt secular factions.
Assad’s regime, despite previous near-collapses, relied on foreign military support to retain power. Yet chronic weakness and decay within the regime became apparent as corruption rendered it ineffective. The loss of support from Hezbollah and a preoccupied Russia were pivotal in the recent defeat, where remnants of Assad’s forces proved unwilling to fight amidst deteriorating morale and conditions.
Looking ahead, the demise of Assad suggests a potential transition for Syria post-civil war. While HTS offers a glimmer of hope compared to the Assad dictatorship, it has a troubling record of suppressing dissent. The overall situation remains precarious; the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army poses further threats, particularly to the Kurdish regions. Overall, the political landscape post-Assad holds the possibility for change, but significant challenges and uncertainties persist.
The downfall of Bashar al-Assad marks a significant moment in Syrian history, allowing for the potential emergence of new political dynamics after years of brutal dictatorship. Although there are prospects for improvement, the victory is tempered by challenges such as the role of HTS and threats to Kurdish autonomy. Ultimately, the end of Assad’s regime paves the way for the long-awaited struggle for democracy to commence in Syria.
Original Source: jacobin.com